Faith and Reason in the Moral Philosophy of Anselm of Canterbury

I suppose I should begin by admitting that this will no doubt be of little or no interest to the vast majority of you who read this blog. However, it is an idea that has occupied a considerable amount of my thought of late, so writing it up seemed the only alternative. This idea is very much half baked, be warned...

One of the common areas of concern in Medieval Moral Philosophy is the point at which rationality is supposed to end and faith is supposed to begin. It is quite clear from the writings of Anselm of Canterbury that he does not wish for man to rely on faith alone in moral matters. Indeed, God has given man the capacity of reason in order (partially) to discern moral truths and to decide what the best moral actions are. What is also clear is that Anselm believes that faith has an important role to play in such moral decisions. He certainly would not have sanctioned activities that were 'unchristian' and goes to great lengths to show that going against the will of God is the greatest sin. The question then becomes one of where reason ends and faith begins.

Now this is not a topic that Anselm addresses with great clarity so a certain degree of guess work must take place. When discussing the truth, Anselm states that the senses do not lie but that the soul can. Perhaps this is the cue for when faith must play its most critical role. If man cannot rely upon his soul to empirically interpret his surroundings, then he must derive the assurances necessary for action from another source. Faith usurps reason only at the point that reason becomes unreliable – when we convert what we believe we know into action. At such a point surety of correct moral action becomes impossible and it is here that Anselm's conception of will becomes especially important. For Anselm, 'uprightness of will' is an end unto itself and the only worthwhile reason for good moral action. Faith then, is what allows the moral agent to have confidence in their 'uprightness of will'. It allows them to act secure in the knowledge that, even if they cannot trust their senses, they can trust their motivation and therefore their moral action.

In such a model it is not that faith provides us with a different course of action than reason, but rather, faith provides us with the assurance that reasoned action is morally right action. It is worth pointing out that the action may still be less than perfect. Anselm allows that the right action, committed for the right reason, may occur to the wrong person. This, while unfortunate and unjust towards that individual, is, to Anselm's mind, still a just action as long as it truly is a case of mistaken identity etc. Faith mitigates these fears further. For Anselm, it leaves one secure in one's actions and able to act in the knowledge that the action will be just.